The Fight for Monte Cassino Abbey 2

141st Infantry Regiment Banner

The attack, at 1100 hours, February 11th, had to be launched from the uncertain positions gained along the slopes south of "Snake's Head" Ridge. These positions, reported clear by other units, were actually secured by fighting when the regiment moved into position. The 1st Battalion, coordinated with other attacking elements, began its advance at the appointed hour. Extremely heavy fire of all types was encountered. The chief obstacle consisted of enemy fire directed into our flank from German positions to the west. No means had been provided for countering or evading the fire. Only short gains were made, primarily by crawling along the barren and rocky surfaces of the ridge and dislodging the enemy from his positions with hand grenades. The fierce close-in struggle continued through the afternoon. Over 1300 hand grenades were used by the battalion during the fight.

The Germans launched two counterattacks, one of severe intensity at 1200 hours and one of smaller proportions at 1600 hours. While both of these attacks were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy, their total effect was to neutralize our efforts to advance, and our position remained relatively the same throughout the afternoon.

Our regiment, which had never recovered from the losses at the River Rapido, now had a fighting strength in the 1st Battalion of but 10 officers and 66 men while in the 3rd we had only 12 officers and 94 men. These two depleted battalions were combined as one unit and instructed to hold present positions, keeping in close touch with the enemy by constant patrolling.

The large number of casualties suffered during the initial occupation and during the attack accentuated the difficult problem of evacuation of wounded from the mountains. Additional litter teams were provided from the Cannon and Anti-Tank Companies and from a group of replacements. To bring one wounded man from the positions in a litter often took a reinforced team of six men from eight to nine hours.

We were not alone in suffering casualties. The enemy, bleeding from our hammering assaults, asked for a truce in order to remove his dead. We watched him remove over 160 German bodies from the area.

One of the most critical aspects of the fighting in the vicinity of Mount Cassino and "Snake's Head" Ridge, in the Mount Caira-Cassino salient, was the supply problem. A forward supply dump was established by us near Portella on a forward slope under enemy observation from the heights. This was as far along the route as it was feasible to use our Nighthawk trucks which came in under the cover of darkness. From here the John E. Pretsch drawing supplies were moved by mule trains into the valley, across the valley floor, and up into the mountain positions, where final distribution points had been established for hand-carry still farther up the rugged slopes.

The trucks were dispatched in the early afternoon from the field train area near San Pietro, loaded at various Army and Division supply points, and arrived at our forward dump at darkness after going through San Vittore, Cervarro, and San Michele. Normally, this route would have been covered in two or three hours. The impassable condition of the muddy, narrow and circuitous road, dubbed the "Rasta Route" by the Engineers, often lengthened the trip to six or seven hours.

Relaying supplies from Portella was the hardest part of the operation. On the night of February 10-11th, during the initial movement into position, we were unable to get enough mules to handle the bulk of supplies. Of the 150 mules promised by Division, only 46 arrived at the newly established mule park near the forward dump. About half of these had been walked for 30 miles during the day and were in no condition for use during the night. Every attempt was made to secure more and some were borrowed from another regiment. Around 0200 hours, February 11th, a train of 55 mules had been organized, loaded and started on the road.

All trails in the precipitous slopes and ridges had to be travelled at night. Almost all the route, and particularly the part leading across the valley floor, was under observation and subjected to enemy fire. Dispersal of the mules was impossible because of the single road through heavily mined fields, and guides had to maintain contact along the trails leading into the slopes.

Almost inconceivable difficulties had to be overcome in order to scale the mountain sides. The rains had loosened the thin covering of mud on the rocky trails, leaving them slippery invitations to death and injury. Along many stretches, footholds were virtually impossible. In many instances, ropes were tied to men in echelon to assist in scaling the heights.

John E. Prentsch drawing During the first nights of the operation, most supplies and equipment were hand-carried into position, because of the inaccessibility of the forward positions to mule transport. Several trucks were rushed across the valley and supplies dumped at the base of the mountain where transfers were made. German concentrations fell in the area and made further use of trucks inadvisable. Accurate mortar fire covered the trails, wounding many men and causing considerable disorganization. Unfamiliarity with the terrain and darkness complicated the task. Some places in the trail were littered with dead mules.