Disaster at the River Rapido 2

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The artillery barrage started during the afternoon and it seemed as if the entire world was being shaken to its very foundations. Over 31,000 rounds were poured into the enemy positions across the river — over one round for every six square yards of the target area. A bombing mission was flown at 1520 hours on the western side of the river north of San Angelo.

By 1800 hours, January 20th, the assault elements of the 1st Battalion began to move into final assembly areas for their boats and guides. Misfortune seemed to dog the weary footsteps, of our veteran troops almost from the very start. Confusion became rampant. Enemy shells had destroyed several of the boats during the afternoon and many boat reassignments and readjustments had to be made. While proceeding from the boat dump to the crossing site, the Engineer guides with Company B lost their way and led the company several hundred yards past the proper place. While the column was being turned around, an enemy concentration landed in the area, killing the Company Commander and seriously wounding the second in command. The Engineer guides lost their, way as the white tape marking cleared lanes was broken and destroyed -by exploding shells, and Company A was led into a mine field and stranded. The Commander was seriously wounded and the second in command took over the confused company and attempted to contact battalion. His efforts were unsuccessful. When elements of the 3rd Battalion began to pass, the second in command attached the company to them and awaited installation of the footbridge.

Following the earlier disorganization of Company B, two officers went to find a path through the mine fields to the river. They were unable to find an opening, and at 0230 hours, January 21st, the Battalion Commander led the company through to the vicinity of the "S" bend. Here the men attempted to launch assault boats. All efforts proved unavailing. The steep banks and the swift current made it impossible to get the boats into the river upright and prevent them from capsizing. Shell fragments destroyed two of the boats and the men were ordered to disperse in the area and await the footbridges.

The enemy's well coordinated defensive fires fell constantly. Mortar and artillery concentrations of great volume. were directed into the site proposed, for the crossing.

Reports from the 143rd Infantry Regiment on our left indicated they were experiencing similar difficulties. One company had succeeded in crossing in boats by 2.243 hours, January 20th, but all attempts to install foot bridges had failed, and they were then attempting to improvise wooden bridges.

Our plans for the 3rd Battalion's footbridges were also beset by unfortunate incidents. Of the four bridges to be installed, one was defective and never taken from the dump. Another was destroyed in a, mine field enroute to the river. The third was destroyed by enemy artillery concentrations in the vicinity of the crossing site. There was left only one serviceable bridge which was finally installed under enemy fire. Companies A and B, followed by a few men from Company C, were rushed across the bridge before the incoming fire became so intense that it was necessary to abandon the bridge.

None of the 3rd Battalion elements had been able to carry out their schedule for crossing on the night of January 20-21st. Attempts to install the eight-ton infantry support bridge resulted in failure. At 0515 hours, January 21st, orders were received that all elements still on the near side of the stream were to be withdrawn to assembly areas before daylight, and the men who had succeeded in crossing were to be instructed to dig in at their present positions and hold. The Commander of our 3rd Battalion and his Operations Officer were seriously wounded at the site of the bridge crossing and had to be evacuated before withdrawal could be accomplished.

All contact with Companies A and B across the stream was lost by the morning of January 21st, and their whereabouts was never accurately determined. All attempts to establish communication proved ineffectual. The sound of friendly small arms fire heard during the day, however, indicated that the men had moved substantially inland from the river line. Bits of information received from several wounded men who had managed to work their way back during the daylight indicated that the units across the river had suffered great casualties. Constant shelling and accurate machine gun fire directed at all movement in their exposed position prevented effectual reorganization or further progress towards their objectives. All communication was hopelessly beyond repair.

The crossing was again attempted at 2100 hours, January 21st, by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, with similar missions, equipment and plans. The 143rd Infantry Regiment was also going to attempt another crossing. Similar difficulties, due to mechanical failures and enemy fire, were encountered as had been experienced, the night before. The assault boats were again inadequate. Numerous boats were lost in the swift current and many others rendered useless by mortar and artillery fire. The majority of men who made the crossing did so on improvised foot bridges, and by 0530 hours, January 22nd, foot elements of all units were across. Enemy mortar and artillery fire did not prove to be quite as intense or as concentrated as it had been on the previous night, but it became increasingly heavy toward morning.

All attempts to install a support bridge were unsuccessful. Efforts to install the original bridge were stopped at 2300 hours, January 21st, and the Engineers were ordered to bring up and install a Bailey bridge instead. Material for the bridge was in position by 0430 hours, January 22nd. Intense, enemy fire met each attempt to install the bridge, and although work on the bridge continued, it was never completed.

Before the arrival of daylight, over 300 smoke pots were placed along the river and ignited. During the day, additional pots were brought in to maintain the screen.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions, once across, pressed forward toward their objectives. Beginning about daybreak, enemy fire of all types began to increase in intensity from the German defensive installations inland. Nevertheless, the men were able to penetrate the first organized German lines of resistance and to break through the barbed wire aprons strung through the open ground. These penetrations varied from 200 to 700 yards beyond the river. Beyond this distance, further advance was impossible, and the troops were forced to dig in on position. Well organized enemy fire swept the area constantly.