The divisional staff received several of the transfers. Pershing in 1917 adopted a staff system that reflected both British and French influence, especially the latter. It "provided for a general staff in each headquarters down to include the division." At the divisional level the new system called for several new positions, of which the most notable were G-1, administrative; G-2, intelligence; and G-3, operations. After some reshuffling, Smith’s staff included the following officers and positions: Colonel Williams, chief of staff; Colonel W. G. Sills, G-1; Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Mason, G-2; Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Atkins, G-3; Lieutenant Colonel Harry Hawley, machine gun officer; Major Culberson, inspector; Major Edward R. Andrews, signal officer; Major Owsley, adjutant; Lieutenant Colonel Metcalfe, surgeon; Major Bolend, sanitary inspector; Major Wren, judge advocate; Major George R. Logan, quartermaster; Captain Edward G. Flaig, ordnance officer; Captain George W. Keitt, gas officer; First Lieutenant Jean P. J. Peutet, interpreter; and First Lieutenants Spence, Edward N. Maher, and Merrill W. Blair, aides. Headquarters Troop was commanded by Captain Wayne B. Davis of Goliad, Texas. The 36th staff as reorganized contained a mixture of Guard, Regular, and National Army officers.¹³

A fairly large number of enlisted men were transferred out at Bar-sur-Aube. The "War Journal" records 2,000 men as having been transferred to divisions "on their way to the front." Captain E. M. Matson stated that troops were taken from every regiment, 700 from the 141st alone. And Star-Telegram staff correspondent B. N. Timmons reported that 1,000 Texas Doughboys left the 36th on August 24, 1918, to go to the 42nd Division.

The Rainbow Division, as the 42nd was nicknamed, was one of five divisions to enter France in 1917. It received all told in 1918 about 9,000 men, largely Texans and Oklahomans from the 36th and 90th Divisions. It was to the 42nd, whose rolls contained the names of men from 26 states, that many of the Camp Bowie transfers had gone. Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur, who performed brilliantly as brigade commander and later commanded the division, was, we are told by General Peyton C. [110] March, Bliss’s successor as Army Chief of Staff, quite pleased with the combat service of the Texans and Oklahomans. In reference to the Texans, MacArthur commented that "I would not want more loyal, faithful or better troops."

March cites the fine performance of the former Panthers, many of them short-timers when they entered the battle line, in support of his view that the training period of American troops in World War I was too long. March was especially critical of Pershing for holding them overlong in the training areas—usually nine or ten weeks—when "a short polishing" was all that was necessary. One of his concerns was that extended training dulled enthusiasm. There is no evidence whatever in the 36th sources that the Panthers suffered a let-down at Bar-sur-Aube. March seems to have favored considerable reductions in the stateside and overseas training periods. It would appear in retrospect, however, that the tremendous problems encountered in the training camps precluded more than a two- or three-month reduction in training schedules and that failure to give open warfare due attention at home made at least several weeks of additional instruction in France necessary. If trainees could have been utilized exclusively as replacements in veteran divisions, they might easily have been committed to battle after three or four months of training. But to have thrown entire divisions of green men into combat against perhaps the best army the world had ever seen, after only a few months of instruction, given the problems of the time, might have been to invite disaster. Pershing’s was the safer way for the situation that existed in 1917-1918.

The strength of the command was increased at Bar-sur-Aube by the arrival of 783 casuals left behind at Camp Bowie and evidently a small number of replacements; otherwise, the losses to other divisions would have been even more critical. The casuals had not come with the 36th because they were sick or AWOL when it left Camp Bowie. One Oklahoma soldier on farm furlough was "so busy with the crops" that he "evidently forgot all about . . . the division" until he caught up with the work on the farm. By that time his leave had expired and the 36th was gone. Whether or not this particular AWOL soldier was allowed to "join his regiment," as he requested in a wire to Greble at Camp Bowie, has not been ascertained.¹⁴

The 36th suffered still another loss at Bar-sur-Aube. On September 10 the entire 111th Regiment Engineers, numbering [111] almost 1,500 officers and men, was entrained and transported northeastward to participate in the first operation of Pershing’s recently-created First American Army. Pershing was in France as early as June, 1917, organizing the AEF and preparing for its utilization as a separate force, but the training, equipping, transport, and reception of American divisions took so much time that there were only eight divisions at his disposal as of April, 1918. The flow of American troops into France increased rapidly after that time, however, until by July 1 the AEF consisted of 24 divisions. The total strength of the AEF on July 31, 1918, the day the first large contingent of Panthers went ashore at Brest, was about 1,169,000 officers and men.

While Pershing’s command was in the process of formation, the crescendo of war was approaching the climactic point. The Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 engineered a revolution and early in 1918 took that country out of the war, thus freeing masses of German troops on the Eastern Front for duty on the Western Front. Hoping to effect a major breakthrough before the Americans arrived in force, the Germans in the spring and summer of 1918 mounted a great offensive against the British and French armies in northern France.

Two assaults were aimed at the British holding the left portion of the front, looking northward, and two were directed against the French northeast of Paris on the right. In March the Germans drove the British back in the St. Quentin area and in April they dented the British line in the region of La Bassee and Armentieres. In May the Germans struck the French sector between Soissons and Rheims and smashed to within 40 miles of Paris. In this action American troops were thrown into the breach at Chateau-Thierry and played an important role in stemming the tide. The 4th Marine Brigade, 2nd Division, won undying fame for its success at Belleau Wood. In July the Germans again hammered the Chateau-Thierry salient in an endeavor to achieve "a decisive victory." Seven American divisions—the equivalent of fourteen French or British divisions in size—assisted the French in repulsing the attack and participated in a counter-attack that forced a German withdrawal from the Maine River. The Second Battle of the Maine, as the latter action was called, began a German retreat that would never be reversed.

Until August 10, 1918, when Pershing’s First American Army was officially created, American divisions and lesser echelons [112] were amalgamated with the British and French, often for training purposes. Pershing stubbornly refused to allow the exclusive use of American troops as replacements under permanent foreign control, the wishes of Generalissimo Ferdinand Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander, and other allied leaders to the contrary notwithstanding, and as soon as sufficient American divisions arrived, he established his long-projected separate army and was assigned a sector to the right of the French in the center.

In war councils late in August and early in September, 1918, the allied commanders planned a series of offensives along the entire Western Front. The British were to attack in the direction of Cambrai, the French were to continue their efforts to push the Germans beyond the Aisne River, and the Americans, with the support of the French Fourth Army immediately to the left, were to attack toward Sedan and Mezieres. A major American objective was to sever the principal German lateral artery of supply, the Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres railroad. There was no question, owing to the extreme importance of the German line of communication, that Pershing’s advance would meet the stiffest resistance. The focus of the American attack, which was to be launched on September 26, was to be in the Meuse River-Argonne Forest area.

As a preliminary to the latter offensive, the First American Army supported by several French divisions was to reduce the St. Mihiel salient. St. Mihiel itself was located on the Meuse River near the German border about 150 miles east of Paris. Clearing the Germans from the St. Mihiel salient would open up a critical rail line, would deprive the Germans of a base from which to harass the Americans in the upcoming Meuse-Argonne campaign, and would place the Americans in position to threaten Metz and cut off German resources in coal and iron.

The St. Mihiel operation could scarcely have been more successful. The battle was actually won in two days, September 12-13. German losses in men and war material were heavy while Pershing’s divisions suffered minimum casualties. The victory was achieved with such ease that some Americans, including General MacArthur, wanted to continue the drive. The First American Army did not do so, however, and moved to attack on the MeuseArgonne front as planned.¹⁵

The 111th Regiment Engineers, consisting of Companies A, B, C, D, E, and F, Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters [113] Detachment, and the 111th Engineer Train, with Colonel Baker and Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. King as first- and second-in-command, respectively, participated in the St. Mihiel operation as engineers of the 1st Corps, First American Army. Nearly half the regiment arrived at Frouard near Nancy southeast of St. Mihiel on the night of the same day as their entrainment at Bar-sur-Aube; the rest detrained the next day, September 11.

After bivouacking at Gezoncourt and Martincourt, within sound of the fighting, the regiment came under fire at Regneville where it was "put to work" resurrecting a road across the battered line of German trenches and wire entanglements. As Frank Goss of Abilene, Texas, told it, the Germans "had been run out of there only that morning" and "the ground was covered with dead Huns." The road was completed the next day and the artillery was "moved up and over the new positions held." The activities of the engineers attracted the attention of the German artillery and, according to P. N. Patterson of Henrietta, Texas, they were subjected to constant "aero attacks." The only casualties, however, were a few draft animals. One of the divisions behind which the regiment worked was the 90th, the 36th’s sister division, which had joined the AEF in June, 1918. Following the heavy fighting, the regiment repaired other roads and utilized a wrecking truck to salvage vehicles put out of commission by enemy fire.

Upon completing their work in the St. Mihiel salient, the engineers hiked generally northwestward toward the Argonne Forest for duty with the 1st Corps in the big Meuse-Argonne drive. Although they marched at night and rested in the woods by day to avoid being seen by hostile aircraft, they came under the "direct observation" of the enemy at Blenod and were shelled for over an hour during which time three men were wounded, several animals were killed, and a couple of wagons were damaged. They arrived at Camp Beaudelle, eighteen miles southwest of Verdun and just south of Les Islettes, on September 22. The companies were distributed to various points nearby and assigned the task of repairing equipment, roads, and bridges in preparation for the advance of the First American Army in the critical MeuseArgonne sector. After a terrific barrage beginning on September 25 that, according to Marvin Woodworth of Minco, Oklahoma, 111th Engineer Train, "made one incessant roar," shook the ground, and caused all the tree leaves to fall and mat the roads, [114] the infantry units went over the top on the morning of the 26th.

Placed in three detachments behind the assaulting divisions of the 1st Corps, the engineers followed the advance, building and repairing roads, constructing contours around craters, operating wrecking trucks, and destroying German mines. Considerable time was spent in the vicinity of Varennes. During a lull in the fighting late in October, the 111th renovated a German delousing station, operated "light railways," and "took charge" of several quarries. With the resumption of the advance on November 1, the engineers found the roads in extreme disrepair owing to the heavy traffic which had cut them to pieces. Some time was consumed in filling shell holes and in directing motor traffic.

Their work throughout the drive was hampered by a seemingly incessant drizzle and by German artillery and bombers. "Not only the artillery," Goss declared, "but the Boche planes gave us a great number of bombs to enjoy. It was not with the greatest ease that we lay and listened to those planes overhead dropping bombs." As to the rain, there was no "beginning" to it in France, Woodworth complained on November 3, because "it never stops long enough to begin." During the entire combat service of the 111th, it lost two men killed and fifteen wounded or gassed. An unidentified company commander had a close call when his "mess tin [was] shot from his hand" while he was eating lunch. Having received 145 replacements on October 15, the engineers completed their tour with more men than they had at the outset.

The headquarters of the regiment after leaving Varennes was located successively at or near Le Chenu Tondu, St. Juvin at Marlincourt Farm, Buzancy, and La Berliere. The headquarters staff was at the last-mentioned place when the Armistice went into effect on November 11. During the five days following the cease-fire the regiment assembled at Le Chenu Tondu and on November 17 "started on its long march to rejoin the 36th Division." The engineers were quite proud of their contribution. Goss boasted in about December, 1918, that the 111th "quit the lines with a grand record as the best engineer unit in the First Corps."¹⁶

The exigencies of the great allied drive also necessitated the services of the main body of the 36th Division. Although Pershing "was loathe to spare any troops from our front," the 36th was a week or two away from completing its advanced training at Bar-sur-Aube, and the division would not necessarily have the benefit [115] of adjusting to the front in a quiet sector with veteran allied units in accordance with AEF policy, the Commander-in-Chief loaned the Panther Division to the French Group of Armies of the Center (GAC), headquarters at Avize 100 miles east of Paris and immediately south of the Maine. As Frederick Palmer, the famed war correspondent and chief censor on Pershing’s staff, stated: "The 36th had no trench experience [in a calm sector], but it could charge and keep on charging in the full flight of American initiative which is not at its worst in their home country of Texas."

The Panthers were nonetheless surprised when on September 23, 1918, Smith received word that the 36th would be moved forthwith to a new area. The Texans and Oklahomans were quite pleased at the prospect of getting into action, but perhaps no one was happier at the turn of events, though for a different reason, than General March, who gloated that Pershing was having "to shove men into the fighting just as fast as he could get them."

The Bar-sur-Aube Training Area was a beehive of activity as the 36th packed up and pulled out. Motor vehicles were driven to the new location while the troops were marched to collection points at Bar-sur-Seine, Bar-sur-Aube, and Brienne-le-Chateau from the southern, middle, and northern portions of the training area, respectively, and entrained by French officers on September 26. The men had, during their approximately seven-week training period, gotten along splendidly with the "French peasant folk" and many of the latter gathered at the stations with moist eyes to wish them "bon chance" and "to wave a farewell." The movement was conducted in secrecy and neither officers nor men knew their precise destination.

Upon entrainment the troops were transported some sixty miles northward over a roundabout route that consumed some nine hours per unit to Avize and Epernay. There they were chagrined to learn that no arrangements had been made for their disposition. After considerable confusion and "unnecessary marching" with "heavy packs," the men were finally crowded into "stone barns and outhouses" along the Marne between Epernay and Chalons. Smith’s PC was located at Pocancy about ten miles west of Chalons. The PC of the 71st Brigade was at Matougues and that of the 72nd at Jalons. The separate units were nearby at Oiry, Plivot, Flavigny, Bouzy, and Vouzy. The 36th was now about eighty miles east of Paris and roughly twenty miles from the [116] French front extending from the Argonne woods east of Somme-Py westward to Rheims and thence to a point north of Chateau-Thierry. Rheims was situated some thirty-five and eighty miles northeast of Chateau-Thierry and Paris, respectively. Somme-Py lay nearly twenty-five miles east of Rheims, over sixteen miles south of the Aisne River, and some twenty-two miles north of Chalons.

On September 28, while the Texas and Oklahoma Doughboys were occupying their billets on the Maine, the ranking German commanders, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich von Ludendorff, agreed to ask their government to seek an end to the war. The allied offensive of September was conceived without thought of final victory in 1918, but it was no sooner under way than the German commanders concluded that their armies could not long hold out against repeated allied attacks featuring fresh American troops. It would, however, be seven long weeks before a cease-fire could be arranged and put into effect.

The 36th, Smith learned, had been assigned to the GAC as a reserve division. Since it might be ordered into action at any time, Smith almost frantically called upon the American high command for replacements, supplies, and equipment. Following are some of the items and percentages short of authorization: Autos, 47; trucks, 49; ambulances, 86; motorcycles, 42; water carts, 96; rolling kitchens, 90; draft animals, 67; combat carts, 76; caissons, 67; Very pistols, 100; and Stokes mortars, 100. The strength of the division was 656 officers and 15,590 men. It was bad enough that the 36th on the Maine was 4.5 and 20 percent short of officers and enlisted men, respectively, but for a green division of any size to enter combat against veteran troops without adequate logistics was to lessen substantially its chances of success.

Few replacements, supplies, and equipment were forthcoming from the SOS because the First American Army itself was in this regard "strained to the utmost." As a matter of fact, Pershing’s army itself was somewhat dependent logistically on the French. Therefore the 36th had to make-do largely with what materials it could scrape together from the French Fifth Army, headquarters at Ay, to which the division was attached for supplies and equipment, and the French Fourth Army, headquarters at Chalons, to which it was finally assigned for service. Smith [117] subsequently stated that the French rendered "every assistance." Spence singled out the French Fifth Army, however, as showing little interest in the division’s discomfiture.

The French promised Smith 300 horses and mules; 75 rolling kitchens; 12 water carts; the 24th French Wagon Company consisting of 100 carts, 200 animals, and teamsters; full supplies of 25mm Very pistols and Stokes mortars; 37mm ammunition; French rifles fitted for firing signal rockets; and other miscellaneous articles. Some of the material was never delivered and part was not received until the division left the area. A large supply of French hand and rifle grenades reported as loaded onto combat wagons never showed up. American ambulances were received to reduce the shortage in this respect to about 25 percent. Two important items the 36th was not generally short on were arms and ammunition. It had brought rifles and Browning weapons from the States and the French remedied arms deficiencies as noted above. There were not enough automatic pistols to go around to those who were supposed to carry them, but plentiful supplies of small arms ammunition were available at the American dump at Melette outside Chalons. Of no little importance, there were no adequate maps available of the anticipated area of operations and the 36th’s ability to reproduce those provided with only two small hectographs was limited.

The additional supplies and equipment notwithstanding, Spence thought the logistical problem still too critical for the 36th to conduct "an independent operation." It nevertheless appears, in retrospect, that, while it was indeed a matter to be much concerned about, it was not so grave that the division could not, with good management, function with considerable effectiveness.

Much time was spent by the 36th on the Maine in redistributing supplies and equipment among the units for the purpose of equalizing the shortages. Some equipment of an individual nature was declared surplus for storage or salvage. The reductions were designed to lighten the load of the troops in offensive combat. The field equipment to be carried by each infantryman was reduced to one each of the following: Wool blanket, suit of underwear, shirt, shelter half, tent rope, overcoat, slicker, mess kit, bayonet and scabbord, condiment can, canteen and cover, cartridge belt, haversack, pack carrier, gas mask, rifle and sling, first aid pouch and carrier; and entrenching tool (pick or shovel). He was also to [118] carry three pairs of wool stockings and five tent poles. Including reserve rations, every officer and enlisted man left the Marne with "a 75 pound pack." Once in action, the Panthers on their own initiative tossed much of their load "into the ditch."

One can only imagine "the worry and apprehension" experienced by General Smith and his commanders in obtaining enough war materials with which to do battle. The thunder of the "distant artillery" could be heard around the clock and the flashes of the big guns could be seen on the horizon at night. German and French aircraft traversed the skies and several towns where the troops stayed were bombed. During one night enemy planes bombed the hospital at Chalons after locating it "by flares." Motorcycles and autos traveled lights-out and mobility was limited by intermittent drizzle. Against this background, Private First Class Alton C. Poe of Brice, Texas, Company H, 142nd Infantry, in the vicinity of Champignuel, wrote his mother on September 29: "Don’t think Mamma it will be very long now before I will be fighting."

Poe’s was an accurate observation. On October 3, the 36th was assigned informally to the French Fourth Army under General Henri Gouraud. The next day formal orders were cut and the 71st Brigade and the 111th Field Signal Battalion began moving out. A few days later the rest of the division departed. Within a week of the first departures, units of the Texas and Oklahoma National Guard division would be veterans of a desperate battle and, sadly, Private Poe would be one of the "killed in action."¹⁷